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Nation-Building and Ethnic Mobilization
in the Soviet Successor States:
The Case of Moldova ·

Introduction

Until the October 1991 Soviet coup, Moldova\ previously known as Bessarabia and the
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, had never known independence, having been part of
Russia, the SovietUnion or Romania for almost its entire history. Like most modem political
entities, the Soviet successor state of Moldova has a multi-ethnic population. The conflicting
perspectives and demands of the different ethnic groups- provide the basis for today's conflict.
Moldova's post-Soviet development merits close analysis for a number of reasons: 1) the
process of political and ethnic mobilization by the Moldovans aimed at creating an
independent nation-state on a territory that had never been- self-governing, 2) the reactive
nationalism on the part of the minority populations that has resulted from the titular group's ·
growing self-assertiveness, 3) the perceptions and potential interventiori of external actors,
each concerned with the position of its ethnic diaspora in the new political and social order,
and 4) the varying strategies proposed and attempted to manage the resulting ethnic conflict.
This analysis will initially address the perspectives of the different actors in contemporary
Moldova in the context of this territory's attempt to build a nation-state and to manage
inherent differences within a developing political process. It specifically focuses upon the
situation of the Russian .minority in Moldova. This minority warrants study not only for its
own sake, but also because it resembles Russian minorities in many of the other former
Soviet republics. With 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the borders of the Russian
Federation, the successor states' indigenous leaderships must find means to incorporate the
Russian minorities in the new political entities that they are trying to create. To do otherwise
risks internal conflict among the ethnic groups or external conflict with Moscow. The
accommodative approach being taken by the Moldovan leadership toward 'the Russians and
other minorities has enjoyed a modicum of success with the right-bank minorities joining the
1

On May 23, 1991, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic renamed itself the Republic of
Moldova, removing the "Soviet Socialist" designation and using the Romanian form of the
name. The capital, known as Kishinev under Soviet rule, now uses the Romanian Chisiriau. This
paper will use Moldova and Chisinau except when the previous forms are found in direct
quotations.
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nation-building process; left-bank Russians, however, continue to pursue territorial
independence.
Moldova provides a case study of a political leadership seeking a positive balance between
the demands of the titular population and the rights of significant minority groups. At first,
the mobilization of the Moldovan population led to a reactive nationalism on the part of the
minorities that threatened not only the development of democratic institutions but also the
existence of the new state. The. Moldovan leaders then made efforts to accommodate the
minority populations--Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz--living in the ri.ew republic. Their
success in incorporating minop.ties into a multi-ethnic government provides some support for
the contention that accommodative rather than exclusionary policies might contribute to
building multi-ethnic and potentially democratic political structures.
Nation-building can only progress in an environment in which differing ethnic points-of-view
can be contained within legitimate political processes. Approaches to contain ethnic violence·
centered on the Dniester's left bank--cultural autonomy, territorial autonomy, ·and outside
intervention--illustrate some of the available tools to manage ethnic conflict not only in
Moldova but also in the other successor states.

Moldova: Neither a Nation nor a State
Today's independent post-Soviet successor state neither restores a previously autonomous
state (like the Baltics) nor satisfies a long-suppressed nationalist aspiration (like Ukraine):
the Moldavians ... can only be considered Romanians; they share exactly the
same language, practise the same faith and have the same history. At every
conceivable opportunity (in the 1870s, in 1918 and in 1941) the inhabitants of
Soviet Moldavia freely opted for union with Romania and considered
themselves Romanian. Furthermore--and despite persistent Russian or Soviet
attempts to prove the contrary--Moldavians never sought nor achieved an
independent existence as a state . . ·. . (Moldavia) is a territory without its
own, separate nation, a political notion rather than an ethnic reality. 2
Historically Moldova, the territory between the Prut and Dniester rivers known as
Bessarabia, was caught between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. As a result of the war
between Russia and Turkey, this area was ruled by Russian tsars from 1812 until 1918.
When the Russian Empire fell, Bessarabia was incorporated into the Romanian state that
emerged after World War I. It came under Soviet influence as the result of the Molotov-
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Jonathan Byal, "Moldavians," The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, Graham
Smith, ed., London, Longman, 1990, pp. 123-124.
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Ribbentrob pact in 1939. Following the Nazi invasion in 1941, Moldova was again
re-incorporated into Romania. Only after 1944 did Moldova begin functioning as a Soviet
Socialist Republic. The strip of land now known as the left bank was reassigned from
Ukraine to Moldova in 1940.
Moldova thus never developed independent state structures. Only since the collapse of the
Soviet Union has Moldova begun the process of nation-building. Moldova is not a
nation-state in the modem usage of the term. 3 Lee Dutter argues that a nation-state has three
features: 1) a bounded geographic area, 2) a centralized and institutionalized governmental
structure engaged in social, economic and military policies and 3) an ethnically and culturally
homogeneous population. 4 Using this standard, Moldova can be said to have only the first of
these features. Moldova could, therefore, be considered a territorial state which is bounded
geographically but does not have a centralized governmental structure nor an ethnically or
culturally homogeneous population. Dutter described the territorial state as one in which "the
physical boundary of the regime's authority exceeds the psychological boundary of its
legitimacy. " 5
John Herz argues that an important characteristic of the nation-state is sovereignty over its
territory. He contends that applying force to rule one's own territory does not constitute
sovereignty. 6 Thus, the Chisinau government does not possess territorial sovereignty because
it must send forces into its own territory, the Dniester area. The question confronting the
Chisfoau government is how can it extend its sovereignty--and establish its
legitimacy--throughout its geographic boundaries?

3

Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and StateNations, "International Studies
Quarterly, Vol.13, 1969, pp. 140-158;':Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives, New
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Multi-Ethnicity: The Seeds of Conflict
Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians

Paradoxically, the policy of the Soviet government toward the population of Moldova was
parallel to that followed by the tsars. To differentiate the Romanian character of Bessarabia
from the developing Romanian state to its west, the tsarist government encouraged
non-Romanian ethnic groups to settle in the territory. Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Jews,
Bulgarians and Gagauz migrated to the territory with grants of land and exclusions from
discriminatory legislation that they faced elsewhere in the Russian .empire. These Nineteenth
Century policies diluted the Romanian population in Bessarabia, with Romanians being found
mostly in the rural areas, and the cities inhabited by non-Romanians. The Ro~anians, who
constituted 80% of the population of BesSarabia in 1812, made up only 56% of the
population a century later. The Soviets pursued economic policies after World War II that led
to the migration of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians to Moldova, also resulting in the
dilution of the indigenous population and the development of large Russian-speaking enclaves
in Moldovan urban areas. Moscow's policies toward Moldova, however, were contradictory:
on one hand, Moscow encouraged Moldovan nationalism as a means to sever linguistic arid
cultural ties with Romania; on the other hand, Moscow attempted to limit the development of
a national consciousness that might be turned against the Soviet center. 7
Moldova's borders today differ somewhat from historic Bessarabia. Sollie additional
territory, including·land historically populated by Romanians and Ukrainians, is included in
present-day Moldova. The contemporary republic has a population of 4,367,000 people
[1991], -with 2.8 million Moldovans (ethnic Romanians) making up the largest population
group (64.5%). Ukrainians are the largest minority, numbering 600,000 (13~8%). Moldova is
the only Soviet successor state in which the Ukrainian minority outnumbers the Russian
minority (13.0%) 8 Of the 600,000 Ukrainians in Moldova, approximately 420,000 are rural
residents whose ancestors have lived in the same region for centuries. The remainder are
urban residents who moved to Moldova after World War II to become part of the labor force
to work in newly developing industrial enterprises. The cities of Beltsy (with 157,000 people,
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Eyal, ·op. cit., p. 124.
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For an analysis of the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova, see Bohdan Nahaylo,
"Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," RFE/RL Research Report, May 1, 1992, pp.
39-45 [NOTE: The authors· wish to acknowledge the importance of the publications of the
RFE/RL Research Institute for chronicling the day-to-day developments in Moldova and in the
other successor states. With the passage of time, other means will become available to analyze
some of this information from other perspectives. For contemporary reporting about the rapidly
developing situation in Moldova, the RFE/RL publications have been invaluable].

4

in the north central area), and Bendery (with 130,000 people, just across the Dniester on the
right bank from Tiraspol) are 70% Russian speaking, relatively equally divided between
Russians and Ukrainians. Chisinau, the capital, has a population of 754,000, of which
325,272 (49.2%) are Moldovan, 174,577 (26.4%) Russian, and 94,253 (14.3%) Ukrainian.
The 560,000 Russians constitute the third largest population group, with 36% living on the
left bank and 64% on the right bank. The Dniester area (left bank), where today's conflict is
concentrated, is home to approximately 200,000Russians, most of whom are post-war
migrants. As Irina Livezeanu points out, the minorities are viewed as an extension of
Soviet--specifically Stalinist--policies. 9
As in the Baltic States, Sovietization in Moldova was accompanied by mass
deportations and a, major influx mainly of Russians but of other Slavs as well.
The Russian population of the republic grew from 6 % of the total in 1940 to
10.2% in 1959 ... and in 1989 stood at 13%. According to the 1989 census,
48 % of the Russians living in Moldova and 33 % of the Ukrainians were born
outside the borders of the republic. The Russians, the majority of whom
settled in the urban centers, became a colonial elite in Moldova ... with
Russified Ukrainians assuming the role of their junior partners. 10
According to William Crowther, not only did the Russian migration after World War II
change the population statistics, it also impacted both the occupational and educational
balance among the ethnic groups. Russians and Russian-speakers moved to the cities, took
the more technical jobs and filled many of the places in educational institutions. A large
number of such opportunities existed for the Russian migrants because many intellectuals
moved from Bessarabia to Romania at the end of World War II or were removed from the
territory during the Stalinist purges in 19401941 and the immediate post-war period. Thus,
the Russian ethnic group and its culture dominated urban, technical and educational life. 11
After years of substantial Russian-speaking migration resulting from the development of
heavy industry during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Moldova, like other successor states, is
currently experiencing a reverse migration process resulting in a re-indigenization of the
9Irina Livezeanu, "The Internationalization of Ethnic Politics in ex-Soviet Moldavia." Paper
presented to the American Association of Slavic Studies Conference, Miami, November, 1991,
p. 9.
10
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population. In spite of theleadership's efforts to champion a multi-ethnic society in which
the cultural traditions of all of the peoples are fostered and respected, emigration data for
1991 show an outflow of 64,000 people from the republic. Of this number, 18,000 were
Jews, 15,000 were Russians, 11,000 were Ukrainians, and 14,000 were Moldovans. Many
went to Israel, Western Europe and the United States. 12
A portion of this emigration is the result of the conflict on the left batik. Reports from
Ukraine indicate that more than 5000 refugees from Moldova have fled to the Odessa region.
Ukraine has tried to seal its border with Moldova to reduce both arms shipments and refugee
flows. Ukraine has been particularly concerned about Russian intervention in the Dniester
situation and the movement of Russian Cossacks crossing the border to fight for the Dniester
Russians against Chisinau.
The Gagauz Minority

Another large population group, the Gagauz, while not indigenous to Moldova, has inhabited
the southern part of the territory from the early part of the Eighteenth Century when they
received substantial gifts of land from the tsars. They are Turkic-speaking Orthodox
Christians who migrated to the southern part of Bessarabia to escape Turkish rule during the
Russian-Ottoman war of 1806-1812. The Gagauz speak a language that is viewed as a dialect
of Ottoman Turkish. Historians are divided on whether the Gagauz are descendants of
Bulgarjans whose language was Turkified, or Turkic tribes who were Christianized. 13
The 1989 Soviet census reports _that 153,000 of the USSR's 197,000 Gagauz live in Moldova.
An additional 27,000 -Gagauz live in the neighboring Odessa Oblast of Ukraine. Almost all of
Moldova's Gagauz live in five southern regions. Gagauz constitute 64% of the population of
Komrat and Ciadar-Lunga, 37% of Vulcanesti, 30% of Basarabeasca, and 27% of Taraclia.
republic" that is seeking autonomy.
These five regions make up the territory of the "Gagauz
These regions comprise 10 % of Moldova's territory, with a population of approximately
300,000. However, even in the area in which they are concentrated, the Gagauz are a
minority.
~

The town of Komrat (population 30,000) is the administrative center of the Gagauz region.
The Gagauz are largely agricultural, working the fertile lands that their ancestors received
from the tsars, now mostly collective farms. Moldovan villages in the Gagauz region have
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poorer land, and the Moldovans living in these regions typically are laborers on state
farms. 14

National (Ethnic) Mobilization: Toward Independence
Language

One of the first steps in mobilizing the indigenous population of Moldova was the passage of
legislation in 1989 making Moldovan (Romanian) the state language in place of Russian and
returning to Latin script for the transcription of the language after having used the Cyrillic.
When the Soviet Union annexed Romanian territories in 1940 and re-occupied them in 1944,
the Latin alphabet which had been used in Moldova to write the Romanian language was
immediately changed to the Cyrillic. With the 1989 language law, signs were replaced and
russified names were changed to their previous designations. While this process proceeded
rapidly and smoothly in the Moldovan-dominated lands in the west, it became a primary
point of controversy in the Russian areas on the left bank of the Dniester and in the Gagauz
regions.
Like in the Baltic Republics, Moldova's initial moves for local autonomy under the Soviet
umbrella soon resulted in calls for complete independence. Moldovans first formed groups in
support of restructuring. These organizations quickly seized the opportunity provided by
Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost to open the door for the development of the
nationalist movement in -Moldova. Indeed, the 1989 Supreme Soviet debate on the language
law brought Gorbachev himself into the local confrontation as he lobbied for maintaining
Russian as the state language; at the same time, this debate propelled Mircea Snegur, then
Chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet Presidium, into the limelight for publicly
opposing Gorbachev's position. The results of forty years of Soviet policy had prepared the
ground for the independence movement:
industrialization and urbanization . . . worked to further the formation of
Moldavian national consciousness--by educating and bringing overwhelmingly
rural Moldavians to more politically charged urban centers--and at the same
time increased the Moldavians' frustration with the subordinate place their
nationality continued to hold within their own republic, in institutions of higher
education, in the party and state bureaucracy, and in Russified cities. 15
The language issue became the first and most important point of contention, on the one hand

14

/bid., p 9.
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mobilizing the Moldovans and making them more cohesive and on the other initiating and
strengthening the Russian backlash. As a cultural issue, it also initlally provided a safer
avenue than an outright move for political independence. Under both tsarist and Soviet
policies, Russian was the language of the educated class in the cities and of inter-ethnic
communication. Moldovan (or, if one prefers, Romanian) had been "contaminated" by many
Russian words and expressions and was used by the peasantry.
The extent to which Russian was the language of the cities is illustrated in a recent article by
Mikhail Guboglo. Just under half of the population of Moldovan urban areas, including
Chisinau, was Moldovan in 1989. Of this group, 10.8% claimed Russian as their native
language and an additional 70.6% claimed to speak Russian fluently. In contrast, only 11 %
of the Russians in the capital of Chisinau claimed competence in Moldovan. 16
Making Moldovan the state language and changing from the Cyrillic to the Latin script were
the key issues of the national movement in 1988 and 1989. The question of alphabet is
symbolic and used by the Moldovans to provide an example of Russian cultural dominance.
Interestingly, symbolism and history are sometimes not congruent:

It is hard for Moldavian nationalists then and now to remember that the
Cyrillic alphabet was not initially imposed on Romanians by an alien
imperialist government. The Cyrillic script was used in Romanian until the
middle of the nineteenth century. While linguistically it might make more
sense to write Romanian with Latin letters, the logic of Latinity did not make
itself felt until the 1840s. The first language of the Orthodox church, the
princely courts, and high culture in the two principalities had been Old Church
Slavonic since the tenth century. For its historic value the Cyrillic alphabet
even had supporters among some Moldavian nationalists. In spite of the
present importance of the Latin alphabet in Moldavia, there was historically no
necessary contradiction between patriotism and a lack of enmity for the
Slavonic and Cyrillic influence on Romanian/Moldavian. 17
Nonetheless, nationalists insisted that Moldovan become the state language as well as the
vehicle for inter-ethnic communication, that the Latin alphabet be adopted and that the
identity of Moldovan and Romanian be acknowledged. Prior to the adoption of the language
law, Russian was not the official state language. Rather, it was used as the language for
inter-ethnic communication and education and was considered to convey a higher status ,than
Moldovan. More importantly, affirmation of the view that Moldovan was a different
language from Romanian and best understood by using the Cyrillic script was "a litmus test

16

Mikhail Guboglo, "Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union Republics,"
Journal of Soviet Nationalities, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter, 1990-1991.
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of one's acceptance of the legitimacy of Soviet rule. " 18
The russification of the educational system was at the root of the status distinction. In
Chisinau, with Moldovans making up 42% of the population, only 18 of 149 kindergartens
were Moldovan. No Moldovan schools existed in Tiraspol for a Moldovan population of
25,000. In addition, all of the instruction in higher education was in Russian. 19 Because the
educational system was conducted almost entirely in Russian, fluency was required to gain
access to the most highly skilled jobs.
As the momentum gathered to change from Russian to Moldovan, so did the fear on the part
of the Russian-speaking population The Popular Front organized rallies and collected over a
million signatures in support of the language legislation. Russians felt threatened by the
Moldovan movement. Other ethnic groups living in Moldova feared that they would have to
learn two languages--Russian and Moldovan--in addition to their native language. 20 On the
right bank,, in spite of the. statements by political leaders to the contrary, a. strong
anti-Russian sentiment was evident:
Moldavia's politicians are moving as fast as they can to divest themselves of
all things Russian. The old Bessarabian part of Moldavia is fast becoming a de
facto little Romania and Russian-speakers, the "uninvited guests" as officials
call them, are being shown the door. Virtually all non-Romanian-speakers will
have to pass language tests by 1995 or lose their jobs. In several firms, testing
has already begun. Skilled Russians, Ukrainians and others are leaving.21
The 1989 language law, though ultimately containing a compromise making both Moldovan
and Russian languages of inter-ethnic communication, provided the catalyst for the
independence movements on the left bank and the Gagauz territory in the south. Crowther
appropriately labels these independence movements "reactive nationalism."
Threatened by efforts of the majority ethnic group to destabilize the status quo
in its own favor, members of the other minorities themselves entered into an
independent political movement in order to increase the cost to the state of
concessions to the Moldavians. The minorities also appealed to the
18

Crowther, op. cit., p. 189.
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Dan Ionescu, "Soviet Moldavia: The State Language Issue," Radio Liberty Report on the
USSR, June 2, 1989.
2

°Livezeanu, "Moldavia, 1917-1990," op. cit., p. 179.

21

"The Bessarabians," The Economist, April 6, 1991, p. 49.

9

national-level political leaders [Moscow] either (1) to defend the status quo,
(2) to guarantee that any con~essions to the Moldavian majority do not damage
the position of minorities in the republic, or (3) if all else fails, to permit the
other minorities to detach themselves from the present political_ unit and form a
political entity of their own, one that would be directly responsible to the
national-level government. 22

The Break with Moscow
What began as a protest in 1989 developed into a revolt in 1990 and into a mature
break-away movement in 1991. Russian and Ukrainian workers went on strike after the
passage of the language law, crippling many of the large industrial enterprises. The Edinstvo
organization on the right bank and the Union of Work Collectives on the left bank were
primary organizers of the strikes. By 1991, the Chisinau government had lost control of the
left bank. The Gagauz SSR proclaimed its independence on August 19, 1991, and the
Dniester SSR followed on September 2, 1991. Conflict commenced from that point, with
both break-away territories forming military units.
Both sides had stressed the ideological rather than the ethnic aspects of the conflict in 1989
and 1990. The left bank leaders, taking an "internationalist" position to counter Moldovan
nationalism, cnticized the Moldovan steps to destroy both socialism and the union. Likewise,
Chisinau attacked the left bank leaders for their opposition to the reforms of Gorbachev and
their wanting to maintain the old political and economic systems. In fact, the Moldovan
leadership maintained this position for a rather long time, tryi~g to further the perception that
the dispute was over issues other than ethnicity. In so doing, it took great pains to adopt
policies in support of minority rights and ethnic harmony.
Moscow at- first ignored the events in Moldova, then sided with the breakaway territories.
Gorbachev himself became involved in attempts at negotiation, proposing three-party
discussions involving the left-bank Russians, the Gagauz and the government in Chisinau.
Because this structure provided de-facto recognition of the independence of the left-bank
territory, the Moldovans declined to participate.
Power shifted in February and March 1990 from the Communists to the Popular Front, a
_largely Moldovan-dominated coalition headed by Mircea Snegur. He was :(rrst elected
Chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, then to the presidency after the Supreme Soviet
created the post. The government was replaced with Popular Front supporters in May 1990
with the selection of Mircea Drue as prime minister. By summer 1990, the reformers, mostly
ethnic Moldovans, were firmly in ·control of the republican governing structures, and the
non-Moldovans, mostly Russian with some Ukrainian and Gagauz support, found themselves
in opposition.

22

Crowther, op. cit., p. 195.
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On June 23, 1990, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty, as
far-reaching as any adopted to that point by the former union republics, which declared that
Moldovan law superseded Soviet law on its territory. In negotiating a new union treaty,
Moldova took the position that any association should be among fifteen equal and sovereign
republics without a center. At the same time, Moldova suspended the Soviet military draft on
its territory. By this 1time, Moldovan leaders cared little about Moscow's potential reaction:
Gorbachev's pressures on Moldavia during the autumn months of 1990, his
failure to discharge the role of "constitutional guarantor" of the republic's
territorial integrity, and Moscow's exploitation of inter-ethnic tensions in
Moldavia seem to have wiped out what still remained of Gorbachev's
popularity with the native majority in the republic . . . . It forced the
Moldavian parliament and government to conclude that the republic's safety
and integrity were at risk within the USSR, strengthening their determination
to resist any Union treaty .... Finally, it unwittingly boosted the political
authority of the Moldavian Popular Front and of intransigent opinion groups
determined to pursue full independence for Moldavia. 23

In December 1990 the Moldovans called a Grand National Assembly in Chisinau and
800,000 took to the str~ts. This action was in response tff.Moscow's pressure and was used
by Chisinau as a vehicle to communicate popular sentiment to Moscow. Between the
December rally and the vote in March on the new union treaty, the Moldovan Supreme
Council met to decide its position on the all-union referendum and its terms for further
association with the center. This February 1991 session of the Supreme Soviet resulted in a
series of votes rejecting the holding of the all-union referendum on Moldovan territory and
endorsing an association of sovereign states with no central power--sometimes labeled the
"fifteen plus zero" confederation. Russian deputies from the left bank boycotted the Suprepie
Soviet session, weakening those who supported the continuation of the union. Some of the
Gagauz deputies ended their boycott and voted in favor of holding the referendum.
Right-bank Russians, some non-Moldovan Communist deputies, and a small number of
Moldovan Communists supported the new union treaty. Ethnic and ideological cleavages
were becoming more closely aligned.
The boycott against the referendum on the union was successful, with perhaps 5 % of the
ethnic Moldovan population participating. The participation on the left bank and Gagauz
areas was very high, but lower than expected among the non-Moldovans living on the right
bank. The reason for the low turnout among the Russians, Ukrainians, and other nonMoldavians on the right bank can be-attributed to several events. The military actions in the
Baltic shocked even the local Russian inhabitants. Secondly, some right-bank Russian and
Ukrainian organizations supported an independent Moldavia and thus undercut the
Communist Party's organizational monopoly. And thirdly, the Popular Front took a very

23 Vladimir
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accommodative position on both language and citizenship toward the non-indigenous
peoples. 24 The left bank and Gagauz support for union was very high; however, as became
clear in a series of opinion polls, the Russian population on the right bank was divided.
Some Russians (like in the Baltic) were beginning to see the advantage of casting their lot
with the Moldovan majority in opposing Moscow and seeking independence.
Determining precisely the extent to which the non-Moldovans on both sides of the Dniester
shared the Moldovans' position on the break with Moscow is difficult. Opinion polling in
Moldova is a recent phenomenon, so one cannot trace shifting favorable/unfavorable ratings
of political parties or positions over time. The Moldovan National Institute of Sociology did
conduct a series of polls, using representativ_e samples, from June 1991 to February 1992
that give some insight into public opinion during this particularly momentous period. When
asked about political parties, the respondents indicated that support was quite splintered, with
only the Popular Front getting the support of over 15 %, and even that support declined to
12% in the late 1991 and early 1992 polls. The Communist Party had 3-8% support in 1991
prior to the coup (before the Party was suspended), and Intermovement's "Edinstvo" support
varied around 5 %• These figures, howev~r, do "not adequately reflect the real extent of
support for communist organizations among Moldova's nonnative population, since the
surveys did not include the Joint Council of Work Collectives [OSTK], the dominant political
force in the Dniester regions's Russified cities." These same surveys reported a "good
performance" rating varying around 67% for President Snegur in three time periods, with
about a 25% "poor performance" rating. The surveys also asked "To which country should
Moldova draw closest?" Only 21 % of the respondents named the USSR, while 62 % selected
various western countries, with the largest number naming Italy (15%). In June 1991, "58%
of the respondents wanted Moldova to become independent from the Soviet Union." That
number climbed to 79 % at the time of the coup. According to the Institute of Sociology,
which conducted the polls, "the evidence that support for independence extended beyond the
65% share of ethnic Moldovans in the republic's population [was] instrumental in
precipitating the decision of the republican leadership to proclaim Moldova's independence
from the USSR on 27 August 1991. "25
The Communist Party, which was associated with the unpopular period of Soviet rule and
economic and political stagnation, maintained solid support only in the Dniester and Gagauz
areas. As the Popular Front was taking the leadership role in the Supreme Soviet, the
Moldovan Communist Party was becoming isolated because of its inability to adapt rapidly to
the changing popular mood.
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The main wing of the Party, .both pro-Gorbachev and reformist, ·supported the indigenous
people's demands for recognition and autonomy; by so doing, it acted against the interests of
the Russian minority, who made up a disproportionately large share of its membership. Not
surprisingly, the Party supported Gorbachev in the can for a riew union treaty, in effect ·
siding with Edinstvo and the hard-line conservatives. This position put the Party out of tune
with the developing sentiment of the ethnic Moldovans. This wing ·of the Party, in spite of its
being radically reformist when compared to previous eras, was rapidly left behind as the
majority adopted a pro-independence, anti-center and anti-communist perspective.
At the same time the Party alienated the traditional communists who found the reforms to be
too threatening and wanted to maintain connections to the conservative political and military
leaders critical of Gorbachev. The conservative wing of the party, with its followers in the
all-union industries and russified cities, found the positions taken by the reformist leadership
of the Party in Chisinau unsupportable. Gorbachev and his reforms were as threatening to the
conservative left-bank leaders as the ethnic revival taking place on the right bank. The left
bank, perhaps to as great a degree as any in the former Soviet Union, was interested in
maintaining the traditional . communist structures more characteristic ·of former
administrations. Its conservative Russians believed that the Moldovan reformers were
"'dismantling the Socialist system' in the republic, 'Romanianizing' Moldavia,
systematically violating the human and national rights of non-Moldavians, and undermining
the state interests of the USSR. " 26

The Coup
The coup of August 1991 only cemented the divisions between the right- and left-bank
forces. Early on the first day of the coup, Moldovan leaders came out publicly against the
by the Emergency
Committee and the military. Not only did President
usurpation ofpower
.
.
Snegur and other leaders state that the Emergency Committee's decrees had no validity on
Moldovan territory, but they also called upon the population to take to the streets to protect
public buildings and communication facilities. Recalling the spring events in the Baltic, the
leadership mobilized popular support to block troops that might try to take control of the
city; People from throughout the republic barricaded entrances to Chisinau. Blocked by
human walls on the nights of August 19 and 20, the military columns never used force to
push past the unarmed civilians. With the collapse of the coup, the troops returned to their
bases.
Russians on the right bank.avoided the confrontation and waited to see what would happen;
the left-bank Russians and the Gagauz quickly sided with the coup leaders. In the
self-proclaimed Dniester SSR,. city and enterprise leaders cabled their support and obedience
to the Emergency Committee. The Dniester Supreme Soviet:

26

Vladimir Socot, "The Moldavian Communists: From Ruling to Opposition Party,"
RFE/RL Research Institute, Report on the USSR, April 5, 1991, p. 17.

13

saluted "the reintroduction of proper order and discipline in all areas of
political and social life" and urged the USSR Supreme Soviet to "endorse the
emergency measures" of the Emergency Committee. The Joint Council of
Work Collectives cabled the Emergency Committee and Gennadii Yanaev its
"full and all-around support," declaring itself "ready to carry out any tasks" in
connection with the state of emergency. 27
Unlike the Baltic situation, where the collapse of the coup provided the opportunity for the
pro-independence and anti-communist political leaders to remove Moscow's supporters from
both enterprise and political leadership, the coup emphasized the extent to which Chisinau
had already lost control over the left bank. The left-bank Party organization kept control of
its property, financial assets and media. Although the Moldovan leaders at first arrested some
left-bank separatists, they were forced by strikes and blockades to release them.
The Party and left-bank leaders argued that groups on the right bank--by being
pro-Moldovan--opposed the interests of the Russian-speaking population (Russian, Ukrainian,
and Gagauz). While the dispute can be seen as ideological, with right-bank reformers being
opposed by left-bank hardliners, it was characterized as ethnic by the Dniester and Gagauz
republics in spite of the Moldovan leaders' efforts to respect the cultural autonomy of the
Russian-speaking population. As hostilities continued throughout Spring 1992, President
Snegur downplayed the ethnic nature of the conflict, arguing on March 5 that both the
Dniester leaders and Moscow "are deliberately portraying the conflict as interethnic ... in
an attempt to disguise the military-communist nature of the phantom 'Dniester republic' and
to win support from the national-patriotic forces of Russia." Snegur argued that "the full
observance of Moldova's territorial integrity and indivisibility" was required to resolve the
conflict. 28
Immediately after the coup, Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union.
Fifty-two of the 130 non-Moldovan deputies voted in favor of independence. Six of the
twelve Gagauz deputies were in favor. The declaration acknowledged Moldova's intent to
adhere to the documents of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
"guaranteeing the exercise of social and cultural rights and political freedoms . . . including
those of national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities" 29 and underscored the
different positions of the left- and right-bank Russians.
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Snegur attempted to convince the non-indigenous people that the new regime would reverse
the Soviet policy of cultural dominance with which all the non-Russian republics had become
familiar by "giving urgent priority to resolving ethnic grievances, establishing a system of
guarantees for the observance of human rights, and developing the facilities for the cultural
and-linguistic expression of the ethnic communities. "30 Rather than replacing russification
with romanization, Chisinau promised that local languages and customs would be respected
and that schools would be provided to accommodate the non-Moldovans' desire for education
in their own language. This approach held some attraction for the Bulgarians and the
Ukrainians, who were particularly offended by the previous russification. On March 26,
1992, Chisinau city authorities announced that they would open five Ukrainian-language
kindergartens for the 1992-1993 school year, as well as a Ukrainian-Russian high school.
These would be the first Ukrainian schools in Moldova since the 1960s when russification
was in high gear.
In a move to show his commitment to a multi-ethnic rather than a Romanian state, ·Snegur
announced on February 24, 1992, that all residents of Moldova would be offered citizenship.
Residents in Moldova would have until June 4 to accept or reject the offer. 31 This inclusive
approach to citizenship was in sharp contrast to the debate taking place in Latvia and
Estonia. The Moldovan decree on citizenship made no mention of exceptions for military
personnel, Party and Komsomol officials, or recent migrants, provisions typical of laws in
other successor states.
Reactive Nationalism: The Push for Autonomy
The Left Bank

The left bank of the Dniester River (the eastern bank, designated "left" in relation to the
flo:w of the Dniester river, which empties into the Black Sea to the southeast) has been the
most troublesome area for Chisinau. The Dniester population of 601,000 is 40.1 %
Moldovan, 28.3% Ukrainian and 25.5% Russian. The term "Russian-speaking" is often used
to refer to the Russians and the Ukrainians together and, to some extent, the Gagauz. Few
schools or cultural facilities were available to the Ukrainians or Gagauz in their own
language, resulting in the minority populations' becoming russified.
The Russian population is made up of relatively recent arrivals resulting from the
industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s. Until the last two decades, Moldovans made up the
absolute majority on the leffbank. All-union industries, many military in nature, and large
Red Army bases drew Russian-speaking migrants to the towns and cities of the left bank.
The Dniester leader, Igor Smirnov, claims that 30% of Moldovan industry and 98.5% of
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energy production is on the left bank of the Dniester. 32
The rural areas of the left bank remain predominantly Moldovan, though a number of
Ukrainian villages exist in this region. Ukraine is quick to point out that the left bank
belonged to it prior to 1940, and that both Moldovans and Ukrainians outnumber Russians in
this area. Tiraspol is the administrative center of the five administrative regions making up
the left bank. Tiraspol is 41 % Russian, 33 % Ukrainian, and 17 % Moldovan.
Since 1990, two groups have provided the primary representation for the people of Russian
nationality: Intermovement's Edinstvo and the United Work Collectives (OTSK). Edinstvo
represented the Communist Party apparatus primarily on the right bank on the Dniester,
including the Party functionaries in Chisinau. The support for the United Work Collectives is
concentrated in the working-class Russian population on the left bank.
Throughout the first ha1.f of 1992, left bank military personnel and communist leaders
expanded their control of the Moldovan villages on the left bank and increasingly made
inroads to the Russian cities on the right -bank. Moldovans described the phenomenon as a
"creeping putsch" which became more violent and bloody as time progressed. The Dniester
loyalists, often organized into paramilitary units by the army .and supported by the
enterprises, took over administrative buildings and police stations in the rural areas and
replaced the indigenous Moldovans with Russians. The local officials and police at first
offered almost no resistance on the orders of the Chisinau government to avoid confrontation
and bloodshed. Finally, after months of incidents on the left bank and various forays across
the Dniester to the right bank, the Moldovan leadership concluded that its patience and
appeasement had not been successful. President Snegur on· March 29, 1992, declared a state
of emergency and called on separatists in the Dniester "to surrender their arms and
acknowledge the authority of the Moldovan government. "33
The failure of the previous year's coup and the imprisonment of its leaders did not result in
moderation of the position taken by left-bank Russians. Unlike the situation in the Baltics
where the titular_ leaders were able either to neutralize or remove pro-Moscow Russian
leaders in the days following the coup, the Dniester leadership stayed in place and even
strengthened its extremist position. In fact, several deputies from the Russian Federation
remarked that "[the Dniester leaders'] political views and slogans in general are even more
right-wing than those of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. "34
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Russia's Fourteenth Army

A source of continuing tension between Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and the CIS involves the
status of the Fourteenth Army headquartered in Tiraspol, the left-bank city that serves as the
"capital" of the Dniester republic. From the beginning of the Dniester independence
movement, these forces, the largest former Red Army unit in Moldova, have provided at
least tacit• support to the Dniester separatists. During the end of 1991 and the first part of
1992, this support became overt as the Fourteenth Army supplied equipment and personnel in
support of the so-called "creeping putsch." The former commander of the Fourteenth Army,
Lieutenant General Gennadii Yakolev, on December 3, 1991, accepted appointment as chief
of defense and security for the Dniester republic "with a mandate to place the Fourteenth
Army and its equipment and bases under the authority of the 'Dniester republic' as of
January 1992. " 35 The situation of the Fourteenth Army underscores the Russian Republic's
and the CIS military's interests in a separatist Dniester region:
The transfer of jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Army meets manifold
convergent interests: that of the "Dniester republic" in acquiring an army of
its own; that of local military personnel in securing continued employment and
residence there; and that of at least some circles in both Moscow and the
military theater and district commands in maintaining a troop presence on the
Dniester. 36
The CIS military, including its commander-in-chief, Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov,
displayed little concern that the Fourteenth Army had aligned itself with the break-away
Dniester republic. A Russian army in a Russian-dominated area located on the western
border of Ukraine and the eastern border of Moldova provides strategic advantages to the
CIS and Russian leadership:
The conflict . . . has a dual nature: it is both a civil and an interstate conflict .
. . . [Moscow's] proposals ... to support civil and regional peace in return
for influence in political and security matters, would seem to confirm the
interpretation that the Dniester conflict and the actions of the Fourteenth Army
have their roots in considerations far transcending the issue of interethnic
relations in Moldova. While feeding to a limited degree on ethnic issues, the
conflict can be traced directly to Moscow's interest in maintaining a political
and military foothold in a strategic area noncontiguous to the present Russian
state but one that leading circles apparently continue to regard as part of
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Russia's sphere of influence, or even as a Russian enclave. 37
On April 1, 1992, the Fourteenth Army was placed under Russian control by a decree
signed by Boris Yeltsin. Removing the army from CIS command and placing it directly
under the control of the Russian Republic increased fears that Moscow might intervene
directly in the escalating conflict on the left bank. At the same time, Russian Republic
Foreign Minister Kozyrev "warned that Russia might resort to 'forcible methods' to protect
the rights of ethnic Russians living in other parts of the CIS. " This statement was not unlike
his earlier comments on the interest of the Russian Republic in the Russian minority in the
Baltic states. In Chisinau, Kozyrev suggested a four-power (Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and
Russia) guarantee for the territorial integrity of Moldova with the suggestion that the Dniester
area be granted the right. of self-determination should the status of Moldova change, meaning
its possible future unification with Romania. The other parties to the talks expressed-little
interest. 38
On April 8, the Russian Congress of Peoples's Deputies discussed a plan to increase Russian
influence in the Dniester by using volunteers from the Fourteenth Army to keep the sides
separated. Needless to say, neither the Moldovan nor Ukrainian leadership viewed the
Fourteenth Army as a neutral force. Moldova, Ukraine and Romania proposed the possibility
of Ukrainian forces' playing the peace-keeping role._ Snegur criticized the Russian
Parliament's suggestions as "intrusion in the domestic affairs of sovereign s!:ates" that "fans
anti-Russian sentiment, setting other peoples, including the Moldovan people, against the
Russian empire. " 39
The dispute continued to intensify, threatening to expand to a Moldovan-Russian Republic
controversy with the possibility of Romanian involvement. Moldovans claimed that the
Fourteenth Army, under direct Russian control, openly aided the separatists. Snegur hinted
that the Romanian army might become involved should the conflict continue. On May 25,
President Snegur declared that the "Moldovan parliament has to choose between two
decisions--either stop military activities in the Dniester region . . . or declare a state of war
on Russia. "40
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In late June, 1992, elements of the Fourteenth Army, reportedly numbering 5000, crossed to
the right bank of the Dniester and became involved in fighting around Bendery, forcing the
Moldovan troops from the city .. Reportedly, "the order for the Fourteenth Army to engage
was given by the high command in Moscow, though the aim was to make a show of force
rather that to wage war. "41 At the same time, the Russian central command appointed
Major General Aleksandr Ledbed, a supporter of Yeltsin during the coup, as the new head of
the Fourteenth Army. Ledbed called the Dniestfrr Republic "a small part of Russia" and the
right-bank city of Bendery "an inalienable party: of the Dniester republic. "42
Ledbed's argument misses the most important reason for the Russian Republic's interest in
the Dniester region. With an army on the Dniester, Russia is able to maintain an important
.strategic position vis-a-vis Ukraine and the Balkans:
the land grab appears to have been designed from the outset to limit the
territorial loss to the Soviet Union or to ;its successor should Moldova fully
consummate the secession and to secure the Dniester area for continued
forward basing of forces of the USSR or its successor at the gateway to the
Balkan countries and in the rear of an independent Ukraine. Carving a new
jurisdiction out of Moldova to host those troops would ensure their continued
deployment irrespective of Moldova's future decisions on the troops' status. 43
In early July, Snegur and Yeltsin met to try to reach some agreement on the conflict which
had killed 425 people between March and June; The two leaders agreed to a cease-fire and
the need to divide the opposing forces. The CIS Summit on July 6 then proposed a joint
force of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Romanian and Bulgarian troops to monitor the cease
fire, provided that Moldova would make a for111al request and pay for the troops. On July 7
the Moldovan parliament voted overwhelmingly to make such a request. 44
Belarus, Romania and Bulgaria declined to participate in the CIS plan, and Moldova
withdrew its request for peacekeeping troops, calling instead on the CSCE to intervene. At
the same time, the Russian Supreme Soviet was calling on the Russian army to intervene to
disarm the combatants, an option of no interest to the Moldovans. Russian Vice President
Rutskoi was sent to Moldova to negotiate autonomy for the left bank, but the Moldovans ·
were not interested in his proposals, asking "whether Moldova was expected to grant
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autonomy to the 40% of the left bank's population who are Moldovans or to the 25.5% who
are Russians. " 45 The situation was further muddled when Russia's Fourteenth Army
Commander, General Ledbed, criticized both Yeltsin and Snegur for their agreement,
illustrating the military's independence from any chain of command.
On July 21, Snegur and Yeltsin signed a bi-lateral agreement to end the fighting in the
Dniester region with the use of Russian troops as\ peacekeepers. This agreement gave the
Dniester the right to decide its own· fate if Moldova should join with Romania. Iriterestingly,
this option had been offered to the Dniester leaders by Chisinau as early as January 1991.
Moldovan officials bad also-offered the Dniester leaders positions in a coalition government
in exchange for settling the dispute. The Dniester leaders rejected the offers and declined to
sign a peace agreement. 46
In fall 1992 the military conflict de-escalated as a result of the agreement between Yeltsin
and Snegur. Russian troops, though hardly a neutral force, separated the parties. During
subsequent months, Moldovans continued to voice concern about the role of the Russians and
the Dniester political authorities continued to establish state structures on the left bank under
the protection of the Russian forces. The joint commission supervising the cease-fire, made
up of Russians and Moldovans, provided a ven~e for the Moldovans to criticize the lack of
even-handedness by the peacekeepers; yet the Moldovans hardly exercise equal authority with
the Russians in any "joint" activity. For this reason, the Moldovans repeatedly asked·for
United Nations' or other neutral involvement in monitoring the cease fire to balance the
unequal Moldovan-Russian relationship.
The presence of the Fourteenth Army remains a problem. While its strength has dropped
from 14,000 at the beginning of 1992, the Fourteenth Army is still the most formidable force
in the region. In addition, the military leaders have been taking steps to blur the lines
between the Russian Fourteenth Army.and the Dniester guard by transferring soldiers back
and forth and moving demobilized soldiers directly from the army to the guard. The Dniester
leaders thus claim that the Russian forces are local rather than foreign. 47
Russian-Moldovan talks on the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army were initiated in fall 1992
as a result ·of the cease-fire agreement. The fact that the parties sat down at a table to di!\cuss
the issue must be perceived as positive; indeed, the discussions were an implicit
acknowledgement that the Russians had troops stationed in foreign territory. Like in the
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Baltics, the Russians want to assure the human rights and security of the Russian population
in Moldova and to gain territorial concessions for the.Dniester authorities in exchange for
troop withdrawals.
Gagauz Autonomy

Because the Gagauz have been heavily russified as a result of Soviet cultural policy, they
often side with the Russian-speakers (and typically are considered to be part of that category)
in the conflict with Chisinau. Under Soviet rule, the Gagauz were denied education in their
own language and opportunities for cultural expression. "Proficiency in the native language
. . . deteriorated . . . to the point where survival of the language is endangered . . . . There
has been no 'Moldavianization' of the Gagauz in Soviet Moldavia ... Only 4.4 percent of
Moldavia's Gagauz claim to speak fluent Moldavian . . . . "48
The Gagauz were outspoken in their opposition to making Moldovan the state language
during the 1989 debate, contending that this step would discriminate against the various
minority groups in Moldova who have already learned Russian as a second language. For
this reason, both the Gagauz and those seeking to establish an independent Dniester Republic
have proposed using Russian as the official language of the break-away territories. Like the
left bank, Russian is the language of inter-ethnic communication in the Gagauz area.
The Gagauz leadership, including president Stefan Topal, is highly russified. Most of the
leaders were members of the Communist Party hierarchy and supported the continuation of
Soviet rule. In the March 1991 vote on the Union, the Gagauz voted almost unanimously to
stay in the USSR; the Moldovans living in the Gagauz area boycotted the election. Gagauz
leaders then supported the coup, making any rapproachment with Chisinau more difficult.
Currently, the Gagauz leadership favors a federal approach, with ·semi-independent Gagauz,
Dniester, and Moldovan territories constituting a Moldovan state. The Gagauz, like the
Dniester Russians, especially fear the unification of Moldova with Romania, believing that
such a step would deny the minorities their identity.
The Moldovans from the beginning supported granting Gagauz cultural autonomy. In fact,
the position taken by the Moldovan leadership toward both the Gagauz and the Russian
minorities is as supportive of cultural autonomy as that found anywhere in the former Soviet
Union:
there remains a considerable reservoir of sympathy among the Moldavian
public . . . irrespective of nationality, towards Gagauz social and cultural
needs. From its inception, the Moldavian Popular Front supported Gagauz
cultural demands, viewing the Gagauz as a natural ally of the Moldavians in
resisting Russification and in pressing for agrarian reforms. Moldavians in
general tend to regard the Gagauz as having been even inore underprivileged
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than themselves under Soviet rule and readily accept the need for a new
dispensation for them. 49
Chisinau, however, distinguishes between cultural and territorial autonomy. The latter is seen
as a threat to the national aspirations of the Moldovan people. The Gagauz might be satisfied
with cultural autonomy, though the sense of Gagauz identity that has developed makes
achieving an accommodation with the Moldovans more difficult; the Russian aspiration for an
independent Dniester republic is proving to be more intractable. · Chisinau's strategy of cultural autonomy, though seemingly genuine and relatively successful
with right-bank Russians and Ukrainians, has thus far failed to provide the necessary
framework for either Dniester or Gagauz incorporation into a Moldovan nation-state. Rejai
and Enloe contend that neither a minority-oriented language nor religious policy can serve as
the "integrative cement" of a society. They argue that the most effective integrative policies
are political and economic rather than cultural. 50 To be successful, states must manipulate
political and economic integrative elements, though such strategies are more difficult than
providing cultural autonomy. Chisinau's attempt to build a multi-ethnic coalition, offering
positions in it to both the left bank and the Gagauz, is at least a step in developing such a
political framework for incorporation.
External Perspectives
Moldovan-Romanian Relations

Moldova is the only successor state in which the indigenous population can identify with a
country outside the former Soviet Union. For this reason, the relationship between Moldova
and Romania is an interesting one that is viewed quite differently on the two sides of the
Prut. Snegur has repeatedly made clear his lack of interest in union with Romania. To the
minority Russians and Gagauz, such a union would reduce their status not only numerically
but also politically and culturally. By continuing to emphasize "two Romanian states,"·
Snegur has managed to reduce the potency of this issue.
Despite Soviet efforts to persuade both Moldovans and Romanians that they were different
peoples, the cultures, languages, and much of the history are the same on both sides of the
Prut River. Even before the coup and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Moldovans
had attained enough autonomy to _allow them to begin re-latinizing their language and
emphasizing their cultural unity with Romanians. While this linkage is important in its own
right, it colors the situation in which the Russian minority in Moldova finds itself. The
Dniester leadership has been using "romanization" to incite the Russian-speaking minorities.
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Potential reunification with Romania threatens the status of the Russian-speakers. For this
reason, talk of reunification in either Bucharest or in Chisinau makes the separatists more
adamant.
As the Dniester situation escalated, Romania played an increasing role as both a military and
diplomatic supporter of the Chisinau government. This role is particularly unsettling to the
Russian population on both banks of the Dniester, since it fears that the "two-state" rhetoric
of President Snegur will be only temporary. While the Romanian leadership articulates the
same "two-state" position, the opposition forces in Romania have been advocating
reunification; the Romanian public, however, seems to have little interest in the-subject.
President Illiescu acknowledges that "pro-unification propaganda in Romania 'has backfired
in Moldova, and. not just among the Russian-speakers but among the Romanian Moldovans
themselves. During the past two years one has witnessed there a movement away from
unification .... The [Moldovan] people's reservations on the issue of unification have
grown.' " 51 In contrast to Moldovan feelings, "the Romanian opposition has signaled a
willingness to give up the left bank of tlie Dniester (which was not part of Greater Romania)
as the price for regaining. the bulk of Moldova for Romania. "52
Talk of reunification on either side of the Prut River fuels left-bank separatism. In Moldova
itself, those advocating long-term independence today are the majority. The Popular Front,
previously a major· player in Moldovan politics, has severely hurt its political -position by
advocating reunification with Romania and now is virtually powerless. The Moldovan
Parliament passed a law on May 26, 1992, requiring that any move to join or leave a state
· would be put to a referendum. To the deputies, this provision puts one more obstacle in the
way of those who advocate unification with Romania, because they have confidence that
public sentiment is overwhelmingly against it. 53
Russia's Domestic and Foreign Policies Intertwined

For two centuries, Russians traveled to the fringes of the Russian and Soviet empires to settle
new lands and work in- the developing industrial infrastructure. The migrants did not perceive
themselves to be going abroad or living in another country; they viewed their country to be
bigger than the lands of the.Russian Federation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has
changed neither these Russians' psychological connections to the center, nor the center's
perception that its responsibilities go beyond the Russian Federation and·include the welfare
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of the Russians living in the successor states. Russians in the so-called "near abroad,"
referring to the non-Russian successor states, remain both a domestic and a foreign-policy
issue in Moscow. This position is illustrated in an article in Rossiiskaya gazetta (June 23,
1992) in which Yeltsin's Presidential Counselor, Sergei Stankevich:
criticized Russian foreign policy for its failure to stand up for the rights of the
Russian population in other CIS states. He also accused [Moldova, Ukraine,
and Georgia] of oppressing their Russian minorities, and threatened the use of
force to protect "a thousand-year history [and] legitimate interests" in those
former republics. Stankevich called upon the 14th Army stationed in Moldova
to defend the Slavic minorities, and he noted that Russia would soon reemerge
as a power capable of protecting its people. 54
Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on International Affairs Ambartsumov
similarly argued that Russia has a responsibility to· the Russian population beyond the Russian
Federation. As he stated, "the Dniester area was never part of Moldova . . . if any
national-territorial community wants to become part of the Russian Federation, it should not
be denied that right. " 55
Russian vice president Rutskoi and some members of the Russian Parliament have taken the
more radical position in.support of the Russian minorities beyond the Russian Federation.
Rutskoi at Yeltsin's request visited the Dniester area on April 5, 1992, and voiced his
support for the separatists (after making similar comments in the Crimea). 56 Yet, believing
that Rutskoi's and Yeltsin'S views are identical is difficult~ since the Dniester president and
his followers were among the first to side with the leac;lers of the coup and remain supporters
of the former Soviet system. Even so, Rutskoi's comments that ~until Russia guarantees the
protection of its citizens wherever they live . . . there will be conflicts on the former
territory of the Soviet Union, (and) there will be thousands of refugees" 57 raise the level of
anxiety about Russian intentions in both Moldova and Ukraine and illustrate the tenuous
balance of power between the Russian conservatives and moderates.
Moldova thus provides a particularly sensitive, but hardly unique, example of the interplay of
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domestic and foreign policy. Other regions--Crimea, Latvia, or Kazakhstan--illustrate the
same issue. Conservative Russian nationalists continue to place events in the context of the
former Soviet Union. Russians were the leading people and played dominant roles throughout
the territory. That Russians, by virtue of their ethnicity, no longer play this role in the
successor states has not been fully integrated in the conservatives' world view. Situations
such as Moldova provide opportunities for the conservatives to display the power and control
that previously existed or that they might wish to exist in the future.
The more moderate forces no longer think that Russia can impose its will on the former
territories and seem to be looking for non-intrusive ways to protect the interests of the
Russian minorities. While they express concern with the plight of their fellow Russians, they
have little confidence in their ability to manage events in the successor states, especially by
force, as was possible under the old regime.

In spite of his statements in support of Russian minorities in the successor states, Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev has taken this relatively moderate position. On a tour of the
successor states in early April 1992, Kozyrev realized the enormous implications of his
previous statements and the way in which the conservatives, still longing for the empire,
were using the issue of the Russian minorities as part of a larger political struggle. Those
criticizing the Foreign Ministry for neglecting the other CIS members w~re displaying "pure
political rivalry" and were characterized-as "the same forces ... attempting to stage a battle
over the question of preserving the Union, this time in the form of the CIS. "58
In addressing the Congress of People's Deputies, Kozyrev dealt specifically with the
Moldovan situation, but had little success in convincing the conservatives, who want Russia
to play a more intrusive· role within the Commonwealth:
Megaphone diplomacy and heroic poses, by me or by anyone else, lead
nowhere, absolutely nowhere. We cannot send a military helicopter for every
Russian:-speaking boy or girl in a school in Moldova . . . . We have to
consider the whole balance of interests. We must not provoke Russophobic
feelings in Moldova, because 75 % of all the Russians and Russian speakers
living in Moldova are beyond the Dniester, on the right bank of the
Dniester. 59
Moscow's rhetoric intensified during spring and summer 1992, reflecting both the situation in
the Dniester and the conservative challenge to Yeltsin taking place in Moscow which has
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been closely followed both in Moldova and in Romania. 6°Following the failure of the
various conflict resolution strategies, the Russian leadership became even.more concerned
about the treatment of Russian minorities in Moldova. Rutskoi signaled a change in Russian
policy when he announced that "[e]veryone must keep in mind that Russia will not tolerate
such treatment [speaking of the Dniester] of Russian-speaking people any longer. "61
Russian military forces complicate the situation and provide a link with the Crimea. At the
CIS summit in Tashkent in May, the Moldovan delegation protested the military support in
the form of arms and training that Russia was providing to_ the Dniester authorities and again
urged Russia to withdraw the Fourteenth Arniy. Snegur vowed: "We will not give up the left
bank of the Dniester to anybody," particularly "not to those who also want to get the Crimea
and also create here [on the Dniester] an outpost against Ukraine. " 62

Approaches to Conflict Resolution
During the period before Gorbachev, Gail Lapidis argues that intrinsic and systemic factors
prevented a resurgence of ethno-nationalism. She cites the overlapping identities and roles of
the population, the lack of a homogeneous attitude on the part of the ethnic groups, and
ultimately the coercion by Moscow as factors mitigating the rise of ethnicity in the Soviet
Union. 63 This policy of coercion and republic dependency provided Moscow with an
effective mechanism for conflict resolution. 64 Jn the present case of Moldova, neither
Moscow no Chisinau can exert the coercion necessary to end the conflict in the Dniester;
Moscow no longer has the legitimacy and Chisinau does not possess the army. As a
consequence, Moscow and Chisinau have supported various proposals designed to end the
ethnic conflict in the Dniester.. While numerous strategies have been advanced, none has been
effective. This .section will examine three conflict resolution strategies to end the ethnic
violence in Moldova: 1) cultural autonomy, 2) territorial autonomy and 3) outside guarantors.
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A fourth strategy, external coercion as had been previously been -applied by Moscow, no
longer remains a realistic approach.
The first strategy attempted was the policy of cultural autonomy that developed from the
original pian of the Popular Front before -the collapse of the Soviet Union and was carried
out by the Chisinau government immediately after independence. This strategy recognized
many of the claims of the minority populations and, by supporting their demands for
linguistic, religious, and educational self-determination, was intended to placate the minority
groups and eliminate the reason for ethnic violence. By granting cultural autonomy, the
Chisinau government-hoped that the diverse populations would identify.with the creation of a
multi-ethnic political entity that would become a nation-state.
The concentration of Russians and Ukrainians on the left bank and the Gagauz in the south
makes their demands important for the Chisinau government to address, even if these groups
are not a majority of the population in these areas. At the same time this·coricentration makes
satisfying cultural demands feasible because the critical mass is present for establishing
schools and other facilities. Lee Dutter argues that "if group members are concentrated, then
some of the disadvantages of small numbers are attenuated. "65
After independence, Chisinau immediately took steps to meet the cultural needs of the
- minorities, always emphasizing that the rebirth of the Moldovan (Romanian) heritage need
not threaten the Russians, Gagauz, Ukrainians, Bulgarians or other groups in Moldova.
Schools, media, and cultural facilities, financed by the Chisinau government, were developed
for the non-Moldovan groups. Yet the left-bank Russians and the Gagauz (who themselves
are minorities in the areas in which their populations are most concentrated) are not satisfied
with "mere" cultural autonomy and are unwilling to make concessions to the other ethnic
groups, and Moldovans in particular, who also inhabit the geographic regions that they
claim. In that regard, left-bank Moldovans appealed for help from the international
community because of:
'anti-Moldovan incitement by local [Russian-language] media' and
discriminatory measures against Moldovans there 'who form over 40 % of the
population. ' The appeal pointed to measures undertaken by the 'Dniester
SSR,' including jamming Radio Kishinev broadcasts to the left bank,
restricting the use of the Latin script in schools_, and replacing
'Moldo-Romanian' with Soviet history on the curriculum of Moldovan
Schools. 66
A second strategy for conflict resolution involves the notion of territorial autonomy. Such an
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approach grants the population concentrated in a particular geographic area control over
certain governmental functions, including education, media and police. Various federal
arrangements around the world provide examples of this approach, including the relationship
of the·union republics to the center in the former Soviet Union. This concept is attractive to
minority peoples living in larger states whose populations are concentrated in defined areas.
While enjoying the benefits of the larger political entity, they can control the day-to-day
application of administrative policy that most directly affects their group.
Like all strategies, this one also has its negative implications. First, as the former Soviet
situation would illustrate, ethnic identification with territory fosters the desire for total
autonomy and independence. Education, culture, language and media, the factors with the
greatest influence on day-to-day existence, emphasize the part rather than the whole and
ethnic differences rather than the political or economic similarities. Territorial boundaries
built on ethnicity thus can become more divisive than integrating.
In Moldova, both the break-away Russians and the break-away Gagauz are themselves
minorities in the territory that they claim. Even if they were the majority in an area, what of
the other minority populations that reside within it? While the Russians· in the Dniester are
resisting learning the Romanian language, they seem to have little problem demanding that
the Moldovans communicate in Russian or use the Cyrillic alphabet for the Romanian
language. This approach seems destined to make the nation-building process more difficult.
The third strategy might be better labeled conflict containment rather than conflict resolution.
This model uses third parties, either international organizations or third-party military forces,
to separate the combatants. A number of variations of this model have been tried in Moldova
in the last year.
In early 1992, the left-bank separatists themselves appealed for United Nations' help, arguing
that their rights were being compromised by the "romanizing" policies of the Chisinau
government. Ultimately, this appeal proved to be unsuccessful. Like in the former
Yugoslavia, the UN has. resisted attempts to involve itself directly in ethnic violence.
Furthermore, in Moldova the lines of aggression are not clearly defined; the distinction
between aggressor and defender is blurred by the conflicting rights of the parties.
In April 1992 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev advanced a second variation of this
approach. He suggested a four-power (Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and Russia) guarantee for
the territorial integrity of Moldova with the suggestion that the Dniester area be granted the
right of self-determination should the status of Moldova change, meaning its possible future
unification with Romania. This proposal drew little interest from the other parties involved.
A similar version was proposed by Yeltsin and Snegur. These two leaders agreed to a
cease-fire and the need to divide the opposing forces. The CIS Summit on July 6, 1992,
agreed to send a joint force of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Romanian and Bulgarian
troops to monitor the ceasefire, provided that Moldova would make a formal request and that
it was willing to pay for the troops. Because of the increasing violence, the Moldovan
parliament agreed to the CIS plan. But Belarus, Romania and Bulgaria declined to
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participate, and Moldova withdrew its request for peace keepers, calling instead on the
CSCE.
The problem confronting Yeltsin: is that the use of a multi-national force is unacceptable to
many of the countries in the region. President Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia stated that
Yeltsin's proposed peace-keeping force is not a proper conflict resolution strategy. "To my
regret, I must state that the Commonwealth has no mechanism to resolve inter-ethnic
conflicts, and all these statements remain mere words. "67 During this time, the Russian
Supreme Soviet was calling on the Russian Fourteenth Army to intervene and disarm the
combatants. Obviously, the Moldovan leadership showed little interest in this option.
None of these strategies has shown much success because of the nature of the underlying
process linking the aspirations of different groups to a single political and economic agenda.
As Rejai and Enloe note:
There is a subtle irony in this formulation . . . . The manipulable, culturally
detachable links are the products of modernization. Modernization depends on
mobilization of all available resources. Mobilization ... has frequently
depended on the existence of nationalism. In other words, the very
instrumental linkages on which the authorities of the new states are wont to
rely are those which require nationalism for their production. 68
Conclusion

The Dniester Russians and other Russian-speakers have legitimate fears of romanization and
their place in the new order. Although previously a minority, they had the privileges of
empire. In their day-to-day lives, their culture and way-of-life set the standard to which
others tried to conform. Clearly, the independence of Moldova threatens this situation both
actually and perceptually. That the Chisinau government articulates a policy of cultural
autonomy for the minority populations and attempts to support them does not reduce the
enormity of the change that the Russians are experiencing. Dismissing the Russian leadership
as hard-line communists or conservatives who want to restore the Soviet Union (both of
which are true) fails to recognize the reality for the Russians and the Russian-speakers.
A negative reaction to the statements of the Dniester leadership and the activities of the
Dniester forces thus misses the point. Sympathies almost inevitably side with the Moldovans'
trying to establish an independent and democratic regime, as with the Latvians' and other
titular groups' trying to throw off the imperial legacy of the Soviets; yet the issues to which
the minority Russians react are genuine, and successful. political approaches to allay their
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fears are hard to find either on the territory of what was the Soviet Union or in other parts of
the world.
The problems being experienced with the break-away Dniester and Gagauz republics have
captured most of the attention in the sphere of ethnic relations. However, the accommodative
policies of the Chisinau government have met some success and favorable reception with the
· ethnic communities on the right bank. Three~quarters of .the Russian population in Moldova
lives in the cities and towns on the right bank; likewise, a siinilar proportion on the
Ukrainian population in Moldova inhabits right-bank villages. Focusing on the left bank
controversy obscures an important part of the inter-ethnic picture.
The Chisinau government has repeatedly taken steps to assure the minorities that make up
sonie 35% of Moldova's population that cultural autonomy is the centerpiece of the
republic's ethnic policy. This stand, together with its position that reunification with Romania
is not a 'policy goal, led many of the Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians on the right bank
to support Moldovan independence. The 52 of 130 non-Moldovan deputies who voted for
independence and the 81 % of the registered voters who voted for Snegur for president
(ethnic Moldovans make up only 65% of the population) are cited as examples that a major
portion of the nonindigenous population is willing to support the new state. 69 At the same
time the accommodative policy might be credited with bringing right-bank Russians and
Moldovans together in a multi-ethnic government in Chisinau that stands for independence
froni both Moscow and Bucharest.

In the short term, the process of nation-building in Moldova will be compromised by these
ethnic relationships. Policy makers' options are limited; mobilizing the indigenous population
creates its own reactive nationalism among the Russians and other minority groups. It also
tempts outside involvement from Moscow, both because the welfare of the Russian diaspora
is an issue in the domestic policy dispute between Russian moderates and conservatives, and
because it invites the military, no longer under strong civilian control, to involve itself in the
local controversy. In spite of its accommodative ethnic policy, the ultimate irony is that the
more the Moldovan leadership attempts to institutionalize its own state structures; the greater
the potential for its actions to be perceived as romanization and lead to unrest.
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